Quantum attacks won’t arrive on a date. They arrive in phases.
Quantum computers do not just change which algorithms we use. They change the whole course of an attack, and attackers start exploiting them long before the headlines say “it’s all over”. This is how the threat unfolds, phase by phase, and what boards can do now.
It started with an uncomfortable statement.
In 2018 Christian told conference audiences that within seven years, much of what we call secure encryption would be weakened: public-key encryption worth close to nothing, symmetric keys worth about half.
The point was never to hit the date. The point was that we would enter a period where our secrets are no longer safe with today’s cryptography.
“My point was never to hit the exact date. The point was that we would enter a period where our secrets are no longer safe. That period is now.”
From quiet collection to the mass market.
The phases describe how the threat develops, without dates. Each one widens the circle of who can attack and who gets hit. Many organisations are already in Phase 0 without knowing it.
This is not a crypto problem for the security team. It is a governance problem.
One step today
Explain to the board why “harvest now, decrypt later” means that tomorrow’s decryption makes yesterday’s email sensitive again, and start with a policy for shorter retention.
The next quarter
- Create a long-term secrets list (10–20 years) for data and communication, and give it an owner.
- Map where RSA and ECC live today, in TLS, VPN, code signing, IoT and PKI, and sketch the rotation paths.
- Add a procurement clause on post-quantum readiness, plus firmware attestation, for all new hardware, SaaS and managed services.
- Start a post-quantum readiness and migration plan, in step with standards and suppliers, not in panic afterwards.
Within 30 days, decide who in your organisation owns the long-term secrets, and ask them to bring a quantum-security plan to the board, before it becomes an incident instead of a planned choice matched to your risk appetite.
When signatures can be forged, presence matters.
Phases 1, 3 and 5 share one theme: the ability to sign as someone else. When keys, certificates and signatures can no longer be trusted on their own, it matters whether a real person was actually there.
Qrlay proves that a real person is present at the screen at the moment of authentication, and is built to move to post-quantum cryptography, with a dedicated work package in 2028. Patent pending
“The past year showed that people, hardware and locations are attack surfaces, and now the encryption algorithm itself.”
Adapted from Christian Warhuus’s talk on the main stage at Attack 2025, presented with Aeger Group. Video by TU Media, used with permission. Questions or speaking requests: post@qrlay.no.